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Abstract
In this paper, I argue that a naturalist approach in philosophy of math-
ematics justiﬁes a pluralist conception of set theory. For the pluralist,
there is not a Single Universe, but there is rather a Multiverse, com-
posed by a plurality of universes generated by various set theories. In
order to justify a pluralistic approach to sets, I apply the two natu-
ralistic principles developed by Penelope Maddy (cfr. Maddy (1997)),
UNIFY and MAXIMIZE, and analyze through them the potential of
the set theoretic multiverse to be the best framework for mathemati-
cal practice. According to UNIFY, an adequate set theory should be
foundational, in the sense that it should allow one to represent all the
currently accepted mathematical theories. As for MAXIMIZE, this
states that any adequate set theory should be as powerful as possible,
allowing one to prove as many results and isomorphisms as possible. In
a recent paper, Maddy (2017) has argued that this two principle justify
ZFC as the best framework for mathematical practice. I argue that,
pace Maddy, these two principles justify a multiverse conception of set
theory, more precisely, the generic multiverse with a core (GMH).
1 The Multiverse
The concept of multiverse was born following the discovery of the phe-
nomenon of independence in set theory: sentences in the language of set
theory, such as the Continuum Hypothesis (CH), that turned to be indepen-
dent from the axioms of ZFC. In order to prove these independence results,
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set theorists make use of models (universes) diﬀerent from the canonical one:
the collection of all these models (universes) constitutes the multiverse.
The multiverse then consists of all the models that satisfy the axioms of
certain set theory: a very liberal notion of the multiverse would admit every
possible universe, for example both ZFC and ZF +¬C, while others would
deﬁne some criterion, e.g. all the universe without Choice (ZF + ¬C,ZF +
AD and so on). In addition, these models contain all the relevant information
on sets. Each of these models is a legitimate universe of set theory; there is
no Single Universe. According to proponents of the multiverse, this lack of
unity cannot be repaired in any way and set theory is precisely the study of
these alternative universes, in which the properties of sets can vary greatly
from one to another.
From a philosophical point of view, we can classify the various types of
multiverse by their commitment to the ontological existence of the universes.
More precisely, we can recognize two main positions:
• a realist multiverse, committed to the full existence of the universes
that form it (e.g. Balaguer's fullblooded Platonism, cfr. Balaguer
(1995) and Balaguer (1998));
• an anti-realist multiverse, that does not commit to the platonic exis-
tence of the universes (this is, for instance, the position defended by
Shelah in Shelah (2002) and Shelah (2003)).
Instead of focusing on the existence of the universes, the mathematical clas-
siﬁcation is based on how we build a hierarchy of all these universes. So we
can have:
• a broad multiverse, where there is no hierarchy at all, and all the uni-
verses have the same status among the others (for instance, Hamkins'
multiverse is a broad multiverse, cfr. Hamkins (2012));
• a generic multiverse, where we diﬀerentiate between universes using a
strong logic (an idea owed to Woodin, in Woodin (2011), from now on
GMΩ) or supposing the existence of a core (an idea owed to Steel, cfr.
Steel (2014), from now on GMH);
• a vertical (or horizontal) multiverse, where all the universes are like on
a ladder, bigger and bigger (or on the same level, but we add more and
more universes of the same size);
• an hyperverse, that is, a multiverse of multiverse (Arrigoni and Fried-
man (2013)).
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One can of course apply the philosophical classiﬁcation to the mathematical
one, which yields a realist and anti-realist version of all these multiverses.
Not all these multiverses are equally appealing. Some are philosophically
weak; others are mathematically trivial. All things considered, a consen-
sus has emerged to the eﬀect that the GMH is to be regarded as the most
promising option. It is very intuitive, and hence philosophically well moti-
vated. And it is mathematically productive: it validates all the theorems of
ZFC, and beyond.
2 The naturalistic approach in philosophy of
mathematics
Naturalism in philosophy of mathematics is a methodological approach that
recommends using mathematical rules and arguments to justify mathemat-
ical objects (usually axioms) and statements about mathematics. In most
cases, this means that a new axiom (or theory) should be tested on the basis
of its actual or potential beneﬁts for mathematical practice. Every single ar-
gument about mathematics should have a speciﬁc mathematical goal. To put
this deﬁnition in a more precise fashion, Maddy (1997) and Maddy (2011)
proposed the following principles as a method to test the strength of new
axioms (and, subsequently, theories):
Principle 1 (UNIFY) The ultimate goal should be a theory where every
structure and every mathematical object can be modelled.
This essentially says that an adequate set theory should be foundational,
in the sense that it should allow one to model most (better: all) of current
mathematical practice.
Principle 2 (MAXIMIZE) The new axioms should be as powerful as pos-
sible, providing all possible results and isomorphisms.
A larger number of possible isomorphisms means that our framework has a
strong capacity to describe mathematical objects and their relationships.
Maddy (2017) further reﬁne UNIFY, and suggests that a theory is foun-
dational if and only if it provides the following:
• Meta-mathematical Corral;
• Elucidation;
• Shared Standard;
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• Risk Assessment.
The ﬁrst thing that comes to mind when talking about a foundational
theory is the possibility to embed all of mathematics in a single theory, that
is, we should be able to prove, in our foundational theory, something general
about all mathematics (Meta-mathematical Corral).
Another important role of the foundational theory is to replace a vague
notion with a more precise one. For example, consider the notion of con-
tinuity which, before Dedekind's work, was somewhat ambiguous. It was
precise enough to generate the calculus, but not enough to become a tool in
the proof of fundamental theorems. Only after it was deﬁned in set-theoretic
terms it became certain and useful for any purpose.
A foundational theory T should provide us with a Shared Standard to
decide if a proof is actually part of mathematics or not. Put diﬀerently, T
should be the judge of what counts as a proof in mathematics and what
not: a formal derivation in the foundational theory should be regarded as
the standard proof in mathematics.
Finally, we should be able to use our foundational theory to assess any
new mathematical object that is considered dangerous and suspicious, and
to determine how risky it is to use it.
Maddy's MAXIMIZE can be rephrased in such a way as to relate it to
Shared Standard (cfr. Maddy (2017)): the foundational theory should be
a Generous Arena in which we can hope to ﬁnd, study and analyze every
mathematical object. According to the revised principle, all the possible
mathematical structures can co-exist in the foundational theory, and their
interrelations can be studied in such a theory. Two observations are in or-
der. First, MAXIMIZE* doesn't go beyond Maddy's original principles, it is
just a way of articulating them diﬀerently. Second, it is worth noting that
the reference to isomorphisms contained in MAXIMIZE is still present in
MAXIMIZE*: if all the various structures from mathematics can co-exist in
a single framework, the total number of isomorphisms grows.
3 A justiﬁcation of the Generic Multiverse with
a core
Maddy (2017) has recently argued that, from a naturalist point of view, the
only possible choice as a foundation for mathematics is the Single Universe
generated by ZFC. She concludes:
In sum, then, it seems to me that the familiar set-theoretic foun-
dations, rough and ready as they are, remain the best tool we have
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for the various important foundational jobs we want done.(Maddy
(2017, p.53))
Her argument mostly relies on UNIFY: the Single Universe still provides a
better foundation than the multiverse, whence there is no need to adopt the
latter. Now, if one considers Hamkins' broad multiverse (Hamkins (2012)),
Maddy's assessment is correct. Because the broad multiverse is so liberal as
to accept every possible universe (including e.g non-well-founded universes,
trivial universes, and so on), the foundational power of the set theoretic
framework is lost. In Hamkins' view, the main job of set theory is to deal
with diﬀerent kinds of constructions, which can verify, or falsify, the same
set-theoretic claims (suche as CH). In such a framework, there is no reason
to ban a particular universe: they are all perfectly legitimate model theoretic
constructions, and thus part of the multiverse.
However, Hamkins' conception falls short on exactly this: considering
the naturalistic principle UNIFY and the foundationality features that come
with it (Meta-mathematical corral, Risk assessment, Elucidation and Shared
Standard), his multiverse cannot provide all these features. The main reason
is that there is no bridge between universes: every universe is isolated
from the others, with its particular concept of set and membership. The
main consequence is that we cannot deﬁne a shared notion of proof, nor
prove or deﬁne anything shared between all the universes. By contrast, the
Single Universe V delivers all these features: we can prove something general
about all mathematics in it, since it can all be reduced in one manageable
package (Meta-mathematical Corral); we can use set-theoretic deﬁnitions to
clear otherwise ambiguous mathematical objects (Elucidation); it is a very
good standard for what counts as a mathematical proof (Shared Standard);
and, ﬁnally, it is very useful when trying to assess the problems with the use
of a certain mathematical object or method. All in all, we can say that ZFC
does a very good job as a foundation for mathematics.
However, Maddy appears to only focus on UNIFY, and to disregard MAX-
IMIZE. The main advantage of any pluralistic framework is that it allows for
the existence of many more structures and objects than the Single Universe.
For instance, in the usual set theoretic universe V we must chose which kind
of set theory is actually generating the universe (for example, the V generated
from ZFC is radically diﬀerent from the universe generated by ZF + AD),
thus restricting the available objects and structures. By contrast, in the
multiverse all these diﬀerent universes would live side by side, ready to be
studied and compared within the same framework.
This is perfectly in line with the naturalistic principle MAXIMIZE: a the-
ory is preferable over another if it proves more isomorphisms. In other words,
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our theory should be a Generous Arena, where we can compare, study and
analyze as many objects and structures as possible. Having all these struc-
ture in the same framework is very helpful for mathematical practice: one
can prove general results about them, search for patterns, and so on.
But how are we sure that the multiverse can actually prove more iso-
morphisms? To see this, let us consider the most simple case: a multiverse
made of two very similar universe, that diﬀer for the least possible amount.
In particular, let's assume that one of these universes is actually equal to
V , and the other diﬀers from it for just one structure. In this case, we can
prove that most of the structures of A are isomorphic to the correspondent
structure of A′. We then get new isomorphisms (in this case particular case,
trivial ones) that are unprovable in V alone.
Returning to the more complex (and not trivial) case of a full multiverse,
we have shown that our new framework is a more Generous Arena than the
Single Universe: there are more mathematical structure and objects than can
co-exist in it, and one can study their interrelations.
If the only possible multiverse was the broad multiverse, Maddy's diagno-
sis would still be correct: the advantages of MAXIMIZE don't counterbalance
the disadvantages of the lost foundationality. The naturalist pluralist, then,
would need to ﬁnd a multiverse conception that is powerful enough to satisfy
MAXIMIZE while retaining the foundationality of UNIFY. I would like to
argue that the generic multiverse with a core GMH (Steel (2014)) is precisely
what the pluralist needs.
In this kind of multiverse, we deﬁne a criterion to narrow the possible
universes, thus compacting the multiverse in a coherent plurality of uni-
verses. This criterion is the existence of a core: indeed, the GMH is built
around a common core of set theoretic truths, common to all universes of the
multiverse. This universes are all extensions of ZFC, or, semantically, all
the universes of the GMH are extensions of V . Such a construction ensures
the satisfaction of both UNIFY and MAXIMIZE.
Indeed, since the GMH is a multiverse, our argument above for MAXI-
MIZE still applies: we can prove more isomorphisms in it than in the Sin-
gle Universe. But how foundational is the GMH? Recall, Maddy's main
argument against the multiverse was that it wasn't foundational enough.
However, the argument no longer applies in the present case because of the
existence of the core. As a matter of fact, since this core is common to all
universes, we can easily deﬁne in it all the foundational feature considered by
Maddy. The core assures us that the rules are the same in every universe, so
our deﬁnition of proof will be preserved across the whole multiverse (Shared
Standard). Also, the language and rules we are using will be the same in
all the multiverse, so a deﬁnition of a mathematical object in one universe
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will still be understandable in other universes (Elucidation). Moreover, if a
mathematical object clashes with something in our core it will be problematic
to use it in every universe of the multiverse (Risk Assessment). Finally, we
will be able to prove something general about not only mathematics, but also
the multiverse itself, since it will be included in the core (Meta-mathematical
Corral). Moreover, this core is ZFC itself, so we are sure that the GMH is
as foundational as V : everything that is true in ZFC, is true in the GMH .
Thus, we can conclude that the GMH satisﬁes both MAXIMIZE and
UNIFY, so, from a naturalistic point of view, we can only conclude, pace
Maddy, that is better than the Single Universe as a framework for mathe-
matical practice.
4 Concluding remarks
In conclusion, I have argued that, from a naturalistic point of view, the
GMH is better than the Single Universe as a framework for mathematical
practice. This is because is just as foundational as the Single Universe, thus
satisfying the principle UNIFY, and it proves more isomorphisms than the
Single Universe, thus satisfying MAXIMIZE.
References
Arrigoni, Tatiana and Sy-David Friedman (2013). The hyperuniverse pro-
gram. In: Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19, pp. 7796.
Balaguer, Mark (1995). A Platonist Epistemology. In: Synthèse 103, pp. 303
325.
 (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hamkins, Joel David (2012). The set-theoretic multiverse. In: Review of
Symbolic Logic 5, pp. 416449.
Maddy, Penelope (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
 (2011). Defending the Axioms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 (2017). Set-theoretic Foundations. In: Foundations of Mathematics. Ed.
by et al. Caicedo Andrés Eduardo.
Shelah, Saharon (2002). The future of Set Theory. In: Israel Mathematical
Conference Proceedings. Ed. by Haim Judah.
 (2003). Logical Dreams. In: Bulletin of the American Mathematical So-
ciety 40, pp. 203228.
7
Steel, John R. (2014). Gödel's program. In: Interpreting Gödel. Ed. by
Juliette Kennedy. Cambridge University Press.
Woodin, William Hugh (2011). The Continuum Hypothesis, the Generic-
Multiverse of Sets and the Ω Conjecture. In: Set Theory, Arithmetic
and Foundation of Mathematics: Theorems, Philosophies. Ed. by Juliette
Kennedy and Roman Kossak. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8
